Iran after the 2009 Election Part 3

By | November 24, 2021

The rulers of Iran will probably not in the long run be able to stagnate the uprising that is already going on against the regime and the republic. The tug of war between authoritarian and pro-reform forces will persist and ride the Islamic Republic like a mare. This development will weaken the republic’s governing capacity.

Authoritarian regimes often discuss what they perceive as internal enemies, that is, smaller groups of their own citizens. In Iran, this behaves differently and more dramatically because here is the majority of the population fighting against the state. As the protesters in the 2009 election showed, the Iranians are a people who fearlessly flag their values, values ‚Äč‚Äčthat the regime has defined as dangerous. Deep and destructive internal strife causes the regime to lose control, destabilization at the top becomes a persistent feature. The regime’s “internal enemies”, such as those who marched in the streets of Iran in protest from June 10 onwards, will increasingly gain a foothold in the country. The very different groups that protested in the metropolis of Tehran,

7: Ethnic differences

According to sourcemakeup, a vacuum of power has been created in the metropolis that ethnic and religious minorities – about 50% of the population – will be interested in exploiting to gain greater room for maneuver in the Persian-dominated republic. Common to the minority groups are bad experiences with the Iranian state; they feel – quite rightly to varying degrees – oppressed and discriminated against.

In contrast to the Balucharans in Baluchistan, the Arabs in Khuzestan and the Kurds in the north, the largest minority group of Azeris (about 20% of the population) has a relatively good relationship with the state, but here too there is a tendency for sporadic uprisings. The information we have received so far from Iran has mostly come from the capital. Little is known so far about the attitudes of Iran’s various minorities to what has happened, attitudes which, in alliance with the attitudes of pro – reform forces in Tehran, may have a decisive effect on the development of the republic.

8: Relations with the United States

Relations between the United States and Iran have become far more problematic since the June 12 presidential election and what followed in the wake of the election. With his frontal rhetorical abilities and psychological insights, Obama shows in his speeches his understanding and not least empathy and willingness to ask for the cause of the injustice the United States has inflicted on Iran, especially when the United States in alliance with Britain overthrows national hero and pro-democracy Mossadeq and installs dictator Reza Shah Pahlavi.

The way Obama conveys the message, the knowledge he presents and the positive impression the recipients have of him as a person, makes him inspire confidence. He has the qualities – ethos – that Aristotle maintained as decisive for whether the message should reach.

However, Obama’s ethos is not enough when it comes to breaking the ice between two nations that have not been able to speak for thirty years. Obama is the loser. His dilemma is the sympathy he has for the protesters on the one hand and “realpolitik” on the other. It is nevertheless the case that if Obama is to be able to safeguard the United States’ interests in the region, he will not get around Iran. The United States needs Iranian support in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, in all cases it will be far easier for the United States to achieve its geopolitical goals in the region with Iran on the team.


The Guardian Council

The Iranian system of government is made up of elements from both the clergy / religion and democracy. In this work of braiding, some are unelected, others are chosen. The unelected are hired by the spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who in turn appoints several unelected persons – including the most powerful body in the Iranian political system, the Guardian Council. There are six theologians and six jurists. The Council shall approve all submissions from the elected National Assembly, and may veto submissions from the National Assembly or the elected President if they believe that a submission is not in accordance with the Constitution.

Facts about Iran

  • Area: 1.5 million km 2
  • Population: Approx. 66.4 million inhabitants (2009). World Bank: 73 million
  • Median age: 27 years (divides the people into two equal parts)
  • Annual population growth: 0.9%
  • Expect life expectancy: 71 years, K: 72.7; M: 69.6
  • Gross domestic product(GDP) per capita by purchasing power (PPP): $ 12,800
  • GDP value creation: agriculture: 11%; industry 42%, services 48%
  • GDP by employment: agriculture: 25%; industry 31%, services 45%
  • Unemployed 2008: 12.5%
  • Writing and reading skills of all> 15 years: 77%. M: 83.5; K: 70.4


Iran after the 2009 Election 3